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15 result(s) for "Ruiz Almendral, Violeta"
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The Spanish Legal Framework for Curbing the Public Debt and the Deficit
Constitutional reform in Spain – Budgetary stability – Debt and deficit limits – Fiscal Compact – Six Pack – Two Pack – Fiscal federalism – ‘State of autonomies’ – Financing of the autonomous communities – Adoption of an ‘internal stability pact’
Autonomy in Subnational Income Taxes
Subnational tax autonomy is a cornerstone of a viable system of fiscal federalism. The underlying principle is that spending by constituent units in a federal or quasi federal country is paid for by revenues that are under the control of that unit. Economists recommend that the taxation base remain the same across all constituent units in a country to minimize administrative and compliance costs as well as tax avoidance activities. There are important differences between constituent units of federal or quasi-federal states in OECD countries with respect to both powers for taxation of personal income and the use made of such powers, if any. Autonomy in Subnational Income Taxes examines tax autonomy as a powerful tool in setting tax rates. Two key issues are examined in detail: first, why proposals giving more power to set tax rates have been implemented (Spain), put forward (UK), stalled (Belguim), or set aside (Germany), and second, how such powers are used in federations whose constituent units have them (Canada, Switzerland, and the United States).
Asymmetrical Federalism in Spain
In January 2010, Spain instituted a new financing system for autonomous communities (ACs).¹ One of its most significant elements is the substantial increase in taxation powers for regional governments. There are also new balancing transfer systems that aim to equalize AC public revenues and guarantee the provision of “essential public services” – services related to education, health, and support for the elderly, etc. The cost of these transfers has considerably increased, especially in such ACS as Madrid and Catalonia where immigration growth has been quantitatively relevant. The system was approved at a difficult economic juncture for Spain, with the country facing
Subnational Tax Autonomy
Most specialists in intergovernmental financial relations hold that subnational tax autonomy is the cornerstone of a viable system of fiscal federalism. Such autonomy, they argue, creates a (partial) relationship between what is spent in a jurisdiction and who pays for it. the principle they apply holds that, at least at the margin, spending by a constituent unit in a federal or quasi-federal country – whether asymmetric or not – should be paid for by revenues that are under the control of that unit. And control means that constituent political leaders have the power to vary what they collect upward or downward to
Subnational tax autonomy in OECD federations
There are important differences between constituent units of federal or quasi-federal states in OECD countries with respect to both powers for taxation of personal income and the use made of such powers, if any. Subnational Tax Autonomy in OECD Federations examines tax autonomy as a powerful tool in setting tax rates. Two key issues are examined in detail: first, why proposals giving more power to set tax rates have been implemented (Spain), put forward (UK), stalled (Belguim), or set aside (Germany), and second, how such powers are used in federations whose constituent units have them (Canada, Switzerland, and the United States).
Sharing Taxes and Sharing the Deficit in Spanish Fiscal Federalism
The aim of this paper is to present a frozen image of the current Spanish system of fiscal federalism, in light of the tensions that the economic situation, has brought about. With this purpose, the author will first broadly offer an outline of how decentralized Spain actually works, and how the decentralization process was brought about. Then he will focus on how the financing system works for most Autonomous Communities. Finally, he will attempt a preliminary analysis of the recent constitutional reform. A main conclusion of this paper is that fiscal federalism in Spain is, in fact, a work in progress.
La tributación del no residente comunitario: entre la Armonización fiscal y el Derecho tributario internacional
The so-called indirect tax harmonization process, undertaken by the European Court of Justice, and partly fueled by the European Commission, is giving place to a radical transformation of non-resident taxation. The traditional principle derived from international taxation, namely, that residents and non-residents deserve a different treatment as they are not in the same position, is increasingly being challenged by the Court and the Commission. The reasoning logic of the Court is not always easy to follow. However, it is slowly becoming clear that, as a consequence of the interaction and common influence of European tax law and International tax law, a Statute of the EU-based non-resident is being created. This means, growingly, that non-residents in a given Member State, that are resident in another, have a distinct regime that profoundly shapes their tax liability. This paper intends to assess the functioning of the said regime, in order to help shed some light in what is increasingly becoming a tax jungle, where Member States reform their Tax Codes in order to align them with the latest ECJ resolution, while the little coherence left creates ever new loopholes that have then to be closed, such increasing the complexity of the tax systems. Finally, the article pays particular attention to the Spanish tax on non-residents (Impuesto sobre la renta de no residentes) in order to show the perverse effects of the indirect harmonization of the tax law.